THAT CAN OF WORMS: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PARENTAL PARTIALITY by Salzberger, Macy
THAT CAN OF WORMS: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PARENTAL PARTIALITY 
Macy Salzberger 
A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial 





 Approved by:  
 Susan Wolf 
 Thomas E. Hill, Jr.  
 Ryan Preston-Roedder  
© 2016 
Macy Salzberger 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
!ii
ABSTRACT 
Macy Salzberger: That Can of Worms: Individual Responsibility and Parental Partiality 
(Under the direction of Susan Wolf) 
What should the egalitarian parent do when acting partially toward their child creates or 
perpetuates inequality? How do we compare the value of goods realized through parent-child 
relationships to the goods of equality? In this paper, I hope to expand on Brighouse and Swift’s 
account of family relationship goods and legitimate and excessive partiality by offering an 
account of how to weigh the value of family relationship goods against the goods of equality. I 
suggest three standards from which a parent can judge whether or not her acts of partiality are 
legitimate: the meaningfulness standard, the adequacy standard, and the reasonableness standard. 
Through these standards, I hope to illuminate what family relationship goods are required or 
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I. Introduction  
What can I do for my child? This question is most often posed as a practical, not moral 
consideration.  After feeding her child, clothing her child, sending her child to school, the well-1
intentioned parent asks herself, what else can I do? How else can I best promote my child’s well-
being and future success? She might, for example, involve herself in her child’s schooling if she 
has the time to do so, insisting that her daughter switch classrooms so that she can have a better 
teacher. As a well-intentioned parent, she looks for all the reasonable ways she might help her 
child succeed in life, given the resources she has at her disposal. 
However, the well-intentioned parent may generate or reinforce a number of inequalities 
by advocating for her child, by using her resources to give her child a better life. For one, her 
child may have access to better education simply by virtue of who her parent is; if the advocating 
parent succeeds, there is one less opportunity for another student whose parent does not advocate 
on his behalf to learn from the better teacher. The resources spent on the daughter could have 
also been spent elsewhere; if her mother had not spent the time advocating on her daughter’s 
behalf, she could have been tutoring someone or advocating for someone with fewer resources at 
home. The mother could have even spent the time advocating for children whose next meal has 
yet to be determined.  
 Swift, Adam. How Not to Be a Hypocrite: School Choice for the Morally Perplexed Parent. New York: 1
Routledge (2003), p9. 
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With these inequalities in mind, “What can I do for my child?” becomes a moral 
question. How can the egalitarian parent justify giving her child advantages when those 
advantages serve to perpetuate inequality? Compared to other relations of partiality, such as 
those between friends, lovers, and compatriots, parental partiality is especially at odds with 
equality. By giving your friend a gift or showing her compassion, you are not likely to be 
conferring any kind of cognitive or competitive advantage. The money spent on a box of 
chocolates for your Valentine might have been used for famine relief, but your Valentine is not 
better positioned for a job interview because he ate a box of chocolates. By contrast, a caring 
parent inevitably confers cognitive and competitive advantage. A well-positioned parent gives 
her child advantage whenever she reads her child a bedtime story, by developing her child’s 
vocabulary more than a parent who does not have the time to read her child stories , or simply 2
chooses not to read her child bedtime stories. Further, some instances of parental partiality, such 
as the parent advocating for her child to switch classrooms, operate in a zero-sum context. Not 
only does the partiality of the well-intentioned parent confer a competitive advantage on her 
child, but the advantage conferred effectively takes away an opportunity from another student 
who will be placed with the lesser teacher. The inegalitarian consequences of such decisions 
probably are not considered by most parents. But a concerned parent, committed to egalitarian 
ideals, should consider these consequences, and a philosopher surely must do so.  
 In their paper, “Legitimate Parental Partiality,” Brighouse and Swift develop an account 
of what constitutes legitimate parental partiality by looking at the specific content of special 
 As Paul Tough notes in How Children Succeed, a typical child who grows up on welfare would need 2
forty-one hours of language-intensive intervention a week to match the vocabulary of a working-class 
child. 
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responsibilities that parents have to their children and how these special responsibilities justify 
parental partiality. They argue that there are particular valuable goods essential to human 
flourishing that can only be realized within the family, so the family is an irreplaceable 
institution for the realization of human flourishing. Parents are legitimately partial, they argue, in 
those instances of partiality that realize the particular family relationship goods that cannot be 
realized elsewhere, whereas instances of partiality that do not realize those particular family 
relationship goods are deemed excessive.  
If we look again at the parent who advocates for her child to switch classrooms, Swift 
and Brighouse argue that the parent is justified insofar as this instance of partiality realizes one 
of the family relationship goods they have identified. If it does not realize one of these 
irreplaceable goods crucial for the realization of human flourishing, the parent is not justified.  
From this account, we can see how paying a private tutor for your child to get into an Ivy 
League university might not provide you or your child with any kind of distinctive contribution 
to your or his flourishing and is thereby not justified. The parent would need to ask herself, what 
good am I trying to realize? Can I realize this good in another way? The parent might say, for 
example, that there is something distinctively valuable about acting on the loving motivation to 
generally advance her child’s well-being, which is precisely what she is doing by hiring her child 
a private tutor. But the parent also must consider if there are ways to realize this good without 
reinforcing inequalities. Can she act from a loving motivation to generally advance her child’s 
well-being without the aim of giving her child a competitive advantage? Perhaps she could 
equally well realize the relationship good by encouraging her child to spend time volunteering, 
an activity that would also generally advance her child’s well-being while also benefitting others. 
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If so, then paying a tutor would not provide either the parent or child with any distinctive 
contribution to flourishing, and would not be justified.  
By contrast, we can see how reading your child a bedtime story does provide a parent and 
a child with a distinctive contribution to their flourishing. If the parent and the child were denied 
the opportunity to read bedtime stories together, they would be denied a kind of intimacy that 
cannot elsewhere be realized. Therefore, the bedtime story would be justified by appeal to 
parent-child relationship goods.   
 While Brighouse and Swift provide a brief taxonomy of what particular goods can only 
be realized within the family and how, they do not provide a method for comparing the values of 
those with the other values held by the egalitarian parent. In fact, they make this explicit in their 
paper, writing:  
Our main aim is to offer a theory about what states must leave parents free to do to, with, 
or for their children if those parents and children are to enjoy the goods distinctively 
made available by familial relationships. It is not to defend a fully specified view on the 
quite general, and controversial, questions of the extent to which parents should be 
legally permitted to pursue, or are in fact morally justified in pursuing, those goods for 
themselves or their children in any particular circumstances. (49)  
Therefore, their account tells us- all other things being equal- when parental partiality is not 
justified in creating or perpetuating inequality. Namely, parental partiality is not justified in 
creating or perpetuating inequality when it does not realize a family relationship good. 
 At this point, some might object to the idea presupposed by Brighouse and Swift that we 
have an obligation to weigh the value of our relationship goods against the value of equality. By 
making parents subject their relationships to such moral scrutiny, we are already asking too much 
of parents. I shall not pursue this question here. Instead, I will take it for granted that a self-
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described egalitarian parent will be concerned with how their relations of partiality affect 
equality- at least to some extent.  
However, Brighouse and Swift leave even the self-described egalitarian parent 
unprepared to weigh the value of relationship goods against the value of equality. They establish 
what is so valuable about the nuclear family: there are distinctively valuable goods only found 
through parent-child relationships. But what should the egalitarian parent do when parental 
partiality that realizes a family relationship good also and by virtue of the same act creates or 
perpetuates inequality? How do we compare the value of family relationship goods to the value 
of equality? In this paper, I hope to expand on Brighouse and Swift’s account of family 
relationship goods and legitimate and excessive partiality by offering an account of how to weigh 
the value of family relationship goods against the value of equality.  
 In the second section, I refine the tension between equality and parental partiality so as to 
provide a manageable scope for discussion. In the third section, I give a reconstruction of the 
argument presented in Brighouse and Swift’s paper “Legitimate Parental Partiality.” Fourth, I 
point out what I take to be the inadequacies of Brighouse and Swift’s account and the 
inegalitarian consequences we find without further articulation of what constitutes legitimate 
parental partiality. I go on to argue what I take to be necessary for a more articulate account of 
legitimate parental partiality, comparing Brighouse and Swift’s account to other accounts of 
partiality more broadly construed. Finally, I present a case study to examine how this fully 
articulate account would be carried out in practice.  
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II. Parental Partiality and Fair Equality of Opportunity  
The conflict between parental partiality and equality has often been discussed as a conflict 
between the family and fair equality of opportunity, most notably by John Rawls. In A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls writes explicitly that the family and fair equality of opportunity are in apparent 
tension. But in order to understand this tension, we must first understand what is meant by fair 
equality of opportunity. Rawls defines fair equality of opportunity as follows.  
Offhand it is not clear what is meant [by fair equality of opportunity], but we might say 
that those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances. More 
specifically, assuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are at the 
same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have 
the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system. In all 
sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for 
everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the same 
abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class. (TJ 63) 
Fair equality of opportunity therefore demands not only that just institutions prevent 
discrimination when it comes to hiring decisions, educational opportunities and so forth, but also 
that just institutions correct for social disadvantage.  
By including fair equality of opportunity as a principle of justice, two institutional 
requirements are imposed on a just society.  First, fair equality of opportunity demands that 3
institutions prevent excessive accumulations of property and wealth. Second, fair equality of 
opportunity demands that institutions maintain equal opportunities of education for all. While 
Rawls leaves the first requirement vague,  the second requirement imposes a positive duty to 4
ensure that individuals who are socially disadvantaged can compete on fair terms with those 
more advantaged by social class.  
 Freeman, 90. 3
 Ibid, 90. 4
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With fair equality of opportunity so defined, the family serves as a barrier to its 
satisfaction. As a barrier to the first requirement, the family serves as a vehicle for excessive 
accumulations of property and wealth; inheritances and family estates ensure that wealth and 
property accumulates to certain families and not to others. As discussed earlier, the family also 
serves as a barrier to equal educational opportunity. Parents can choose schools competitively, 
and even choose teachers competitively, ensuring unequal outcomes for students based on their 
social advantage. As Rawls himself writes, “The principle of fair equality of opportunity can 
only be imperfectly carried out, at least as long as some form of the family exists” (TJ 64). The 
egalitarian concerned with fair equality of opportunity is thus faced with the question: how do 
we resolve the tension between fair equality of opportunity and the family?  
Some feminists have taken the ideal of fair equality of opportunity as grounds for arguing 
that we ought to abolish the family. ,  As a way of mitigating the concern for the tension between 5 6
the family and fair equality of opportunity and resisting the call to abolish the family, Brighouse 
and Swift present their “family relationship goods” account. According to Brighouse and Swift, 
these family relationship goods give us good reason for preserving the family, despite its tension 
with fair equality of opportunity.  
 In the subsequent sections, I follow Brighouse and Swift in assuming that the egalitarian 
parent is concerned with the Rawlsian ideal of fair equality of opportunity. To refrain from 
making further assumptions about the interests and objectives of the egalitarian parent , I will 7
 Ibid, 97. 5
 For example, see Mumoz-Darde, Veronique, “Is the Family to Be Abolished Then?” Proceedings of the 6
Aristotelian Society XCXIX 99, 1999, 37-56. 
 This is not to say that the further interests and objectives of the egalitarian parent are not important or 7
even less important. My ambition by limiting the assumptions about the interests and objectives of the 
egalitarian parent is to appeal to a fairly unobjectionable form of egalitarianism. 
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use fair equality of opportunity as the measure of equality with which the egalitarian parent is 
concerned. By looking at Brighouse and Swift’s account of legitimate parental partiality, I hope 
to show that we ought not abolish the family, given ideal circumstances. I then use Brighouse 
and Swift’s account of family relationship goods to determine legitimate parental partiality in 
non-ideal circumstances.  
III. Brighouse and Swift’s Account 
In the literature on partiality, the question of what constitutes legitimate partiality has been 
discussed only in the abstract, as if all relationships of partiality deserve equal treatment. By 
contrast, Brighouse and Swift urge attention toward the relationship specificity of the content of 
partial interests and responsibilities. According to Brighouse and Swift, what particular kinds of 
partiality are permitted is dependent on the particular features of the relationship. What you have 
reason to do in order to enjoy a friendship might be entirely different from what you have reason 
to do in order to enjoy a relationship with your compatriots, with your students, or with your 
child. Therefore, it is not sufficient to discuss partiality in the abstract; we need to look at the 
particular features of the relationship in order to see what kinds of partiality are permitted. What 
might be permitted for friends, compatriots, and parents and children ultimately depends on the 
particular features of each relationship, and not simply that they are relationships. 
In order to answer the question “what constitutes legitimate parental partiality?” 
Brighouse and Swift investigate what particular kinds of partiality are necessary to promote the 
valuable relationship features that the family facilitates and protects. These valuable relationship 
features explain why it is best for children to be raised in families, as opposed to being raised in 
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state-run child-rearing institutions. While state-run child-rearing institutions might be more 
consistent with egalitarian principles, state-run child-rearing institutions deny children and adults 
the valuable relationship features that are realized in the parent-child relationship. Given a trade-
off between a more equal state in which all children receive the exact same attention, care, and 
resources in a state-run child-rearing institution and a state in which we are able to realize these 
valuable relationship features, any reasonable person, according to Brighouse and Swift, would 
choose the latter state. Given that any reasonable person would seem to choose the latter state, 
and insofar as partial treatment is necessary to realize the valuable relationship features found in 
the latter state, the valuable relationship features realized through parent-child relationships 
justify partial treatment.  
 What, then, are these valuable relationship features that justify partial treatment? 
According to Brighouse and Swift, there are various valuable “relationship goods” that are 
distinctive to parent-child relationships. These relationship goods can only be realized through 
the family, and thus cannot be realized through other means that might not interfere with 
equality. While not exhaustive, Brighouse and Swift provide the following list of examples of 
relationship goods realized or produced in the family.  
1. Children enjoy the loving attention of, and bond with, a particular adult, a relationship 
that is widely regarded as essential for their emotional development.  
2. Children enjoy a sense of continuity with (or belonging or attachment to) the past, 
mediated by acquaintance with their own family members. 
3. Children enjoy the security provided by the presence of someone with a special duty of 
care for them.  
4. Parents enjoy a distinctively valuable relationship with their children; one that is intimate 
and mutually loving, but in which the parent acts as a fiduciary for her child’s 
nondevelopmental interests and for her interests in physical, cognitive, emotional, and 
moral development, which include, usually, the interest in becoming an adult who is 
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independent of her parents, capable of taking over responsibility for her own judgment 
and for her own welfare. (54) 
The first three family relationship goods accrue to the child, while the last accrues to the parent. 
Brighouse and Swift argue that these goods are a distinctive source of flourishing because they 
are unavailable through other relationships.  
To see why these relationship goods are distinctive of the family, consider the following. 
A child who receives the loving attention of and bonds with her mother receives a good that is 
essential for her emotional development.  From the attention and bond with her mother, she is 8
not only happier but also comes to understand that she is a person who deserves love and 
attention, setting her up for future emotional success. Such nurturance is not available in a more 
egalitarian state-run institution, unless the egalitarian institution could somehow mimic parent-
child relationships.  Further, it seems unlikely that she will receive this kind of loving attention 9
elsewhere. Perhaps her teachers will take a particular interest in her, or her grandparents will give 
her the attention her mother won’t. But in either case, the adult would be acting as if they were 
the parent. The kind of care-taking the teacher or the grandparent takes on is typically associated 
only with the parent. Therefore, the care-taking role assumed by the teacher or grandparent can 
be called “parental-like.” While the “parental-like” relationship does not rely on strictly parental 
partiality, it faces the same egalitarian obstacles.  
 Perhaps parent-child relationships are not the only relationships through which this good can be 8
realized. However, it seems as though this good can only be realized by someone with a parental-like 
relationship, such as a grandparent or an aunt or uncle. This is not a strike against parental partiality, but 
rather a strike against parenting traditionally conceived of as a wife and husband pair. As B&S write, “any 
alternative institution would have to provide a parent-like bond between some adult and each child, the 
successful establishment and maintenance of which would raise the same issues that animate us 
here.” (54). 
 And then the same egalitarian worries would likely arise, only in an institutional context!9
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Likewise, the relationship good accruing to the parent cannot be realized elsewhere. 
Consider a friendship with another adult. In all but exceptional cases, an adult would not play a 
fiduciary role for a colleague, a spouse, a sibling, or a friend. Not only do parents play a 
fiduciary role, they also have a non-fiduciary interest in being able to play a fiduciary role. 
According to Brighouse and Swift, playing a fiduciary role in someone else’s life is a distinctive 
source of flourishing for most adults.   10
 By taking account of the various relationship goods exclusively realizable through the 
family, the relationship goods that motivate our interest in having nuclear families, we can come 
to understand what particular forms of partiality are necessary to realize those goods. In other 
words, parents must be allowed to be partial toward their children to the extent that partiality is 
necessary to realize family relationship goods. Of course, relationship goods listed above are not 
exhaustive of the distinctive relationship goods realized through the family; they serve to 
demonstrate what kinds of goods are realized, and exclusively realized, through parent-child 
relationships.  
 To illustrate the distinctive value of family relationship goods and their tension with fair 
equality of opportunity, Brighouse and Swift ask us to consider the parent who reads her child 
bedtime stories. Take Stacey. If Stacey spends time reading to her child, Tom, she makes him 
more competitive than his peer John whose parent does not read him bedtime stories. Tom’s 
vocabulary is much greater and he enjoys life much more because of the intimate relationship 
 Two objections might be raised at this point. For one, an adult might realize this good by working as a 10
care-taker for someone with a disability or for the elderly. However, such care-taking seems to realize a 
distinct good- the adult does not play a role in cultivating an autonomous individual. Second, it might be 
objected that parenting is not necessary for an adult to attain fulfillment. Brighouse and Swift do not 
meant to argue that this is true for all adults- they only mean to suggest that for some adults, it is 
necessary to attain fulfillment. The only way to refute this claim would be, of course, to empirically verify 
that this relationship good is not necessary for any adult to attain fulfillment. 
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maintained with Stacey through their shared time, spatial closeness and background for future 
discussions. While Stacey and Tom disrupt equality by giving Tom an advantage over John, 
Stacey and Tom are only able to realize the kind of intimacy they have through their parent-child 
relationship. It is unlikely Tom would feel as safe and close to someone without Stacey giving 
him the advantage conferred through bedtime stories. Perhaps Stacey could find some other way 
to maintain such an intimate connection with Tom, but any such way we can imagine- sharing a 
hobby, taking Tom to church, and so forth- would also confer some kind of advantage onto Tom 
that John simply would not have if his parent were not as involved as Stacey.  
 In order to isolate the tension strictly between parental partiality and fair equality of 
opportunity, we can further assume certain background conditions. Borrowing the Rawlsian 
framework once again, we can assume that John has been guaranteed certain basic freedoms. For 
example, John has already been guaranteed a life free from discrimination, violence, and 
coercion. John will always have food on his plate and a public school to attend. With these 
background assumptions about John’s institutionally guaranteed provisions in mind, Brighouse 
and Swift argue that it would be unreasonable for someone to say that Stacey ought not read Tom 
a bedtime story. Sure, Stacey confers a competitive advantage onto Tom. But what kind of world 
would we live in if we were deprived of the good of such intimacy whenever it compromised fair 
equality of opportunity? Given that we prefer the state in which parental partiality occurs over 
the state in which children are raised in state-run institutions to ensure strict fair equality of 
opportunity, Brighouse and Swift conclude that, at least in certain instances, the value of the 
family outweighs the value of fair equality of opportunity. Therefore, the family ought to be 
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preserved and parental partiality should be allowed, despite their tension with fair equality of 
opportunity.  
IV. A Challenge for Brighouse and Swift 
The difficulty with Brighouse and Swift’s background assumptions and the Rawlsian framework 
more generally is that we cannot assume just background institutions that guarantee basic 
freedoms for John. As Brighouse and Swift acknowledge, “the real world is characterized by 
deprivation more urgent than the absence of the opportunity to compete on fair terms” (74). Full 
of inequalities existing prior to any acts of parental partiality, the real world presents us with 
challenges far more complicated than deciding between state-run child-rearing institutions and 
nuclear families, between Stacey reading Tom a bedtime story and deciding against conferring 
any kind of competitive advantage onto him. Answering the question of what is so valuable 
about the family is therefore not sufficient to answer the question of the extent to which parents 
are justified being partial to their children in any given circumstance.  11
 To understand what complications parents face in non-ideal circumstances, consider the 
parent who wants to send her child to a private school. Sarah and Jill live in a neighborhood 
where the public school does not competitively prepare its students for college admissions. There 
are very few counselors, teachers are stretched too thin to write careful letters of 
recommendation, classrooms are pouring over with students, textbooks are outdated, and 
teachers are granted very little freedom to develop syllabi. At the public school, Sarah and Jill are 
quite active; they regularly attend PTA meetings advocating for students and for good teachers 
 Brighouse and Swift write, “That can of worms is matter for another article” (49). 11
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whose jobs are threatened by cheaper labor, they volunteer at events, and so on. Their child, 
Matt, has his eyes on a small liberal arts college. Sarah and Jill imagine that Matt would be 
happier both at the private school and at a small liberal arts college; Matt thrives in small 
classrooms with teachers and peers who challenge him. Clearly, Matt is not being challenged to 
his potential at the public school and the course catalogue for the community college limits 
Matt’s ability to study photography, philosophy, or Russian literature. The nearby private school 
would competitively prepare Matt for the liberal arts college of his dreams and he would be 
happier in the meantime.  
 If Sarah and Jill act on their motivation to send Matt to private school, they realize a 
family relationship good. There is something distinctively valuable about a parent being 
motivated by the general desire to improve the quality of their children’s lives. While we 
commonly act with a general desire to improve the quality of our loved ones’ lives- our friends, 
our lovers, even maybe our colleagues- the parent alone occupies a fiduciary role with her child. 
So, Sarah and Jill are motivated by the general desire to improve the quality of Matt’s life while 
entrusted with Matt’s future.  
When we act from a general desire to improve the quality of a friend’s life, we do not act 
as if we have been entrusted with our friend’s future. We would be rightly charged with 
paternalism if we acted toward our friends with that understanding. Therefore, there is something 
distinctive about the parent’s interest in improving the quality of their children’s lives. And this 
general desire is distinctively valuable; both the parent and the child find this good to be a 
distinctive source of flourishing.  
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 By sending Matt to private school, Sarah and Jill do more than confer a minor 
competitive advantage while realizing some other family relationship good. Part of the good 
realized by sending Matt to private school is simply the competitive advantage. Furthermore, 
Sarah and Jill take away resources from other students by sending Matt to private school. Sarah 
and Jill will no longer be volunteering at the school, attending PTA meetings, and advocating for 
teachers and other students. The public school loses two very involved parents capable of 
affecting change in the school when Sarah and Jill transfer Matt to a private school.  
Sarah and Jill would face the same sorts of egalitarian challenges if they were to simply 
move to a wealthier school district where Matt could attend a better public school. The PTA at 
the wealthier school is full of parents with resources available to them and with the interest to 
attend regularly and advocate for teachers and students. By switching to a wealthier district, 
Sarah and Jill would then still be removing much valued resources from their previous public 
school without benefitting another school in need. Therefore, they worsen the educational 
opportunities of less advantaged children.  
With Brighouse and Swift’s account in their back pocket, Sarah and Jill can assure 
themselves that by transferring Matt they are realizing a valuable relationship good. It is, all 
things being equal, a good thing that they are so motivated to improve Matt’s quality of life.  But 
there is also something valuable about Sarah and Jill contributing to the worse-off public school. 
By staying in their district and leaving Matt in public school, Sarah and Jill have the ability to 
keep the school from sliding further into inadequacy, benefitting the students and teachers who 
are there. What Brighouse and Swift’s account cannot tell Sarah and Jill is how they ought to 
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weigh the value of acting to improve Matt’s quality of life against the value benefitting the 
school.  
V. Legitimate Parental Partiality Redefined 
Brighouse and Swift have attempted to identify the distinctive goods realized by the family and 
thereby to provide the basis for a distinction between legitimate and excessive parental partiality. 
Unlike previous accounts of partiality, they derive the content of particular reasons for action 
from the goods realized by a particular kind of relationship. From this account, they can show 
what acts in particular can be justified in some circumstances by appeal to the value of parental 
partiality. For example, if leaving your child an inheritance does not realize a family relationship 
good, it cannot be justified by appeal to the family. Brighouse and Swift are thus positioned to 
say why some inequalities often justified by appeal to “family values” are not in fact justified by 
them at all.  
 However, Brighouse and Swift’s account does not provide us with a fully articulate basis 
for the distinction between legitimate and excessive parental partiality. We still have to ask 
ourselves under what circumstances we are justified in realizing family relationship goods and  
what degree of realization of these goods is permitted. When does the value of our family 
relationship goods outweigh the value of fair equality of opportunity? When are we asking too 
much of parents by even asking them to make that comparison?  
 The egalitarian parent might argue that it is not their responsibility to ensure fair equality 
of opportunity at all. A well-versed parent might even cite Rawls, noting that the requirements of 
fair equality of opportunity refer to the responsibilities of just institutions, not to the 
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responsibilities of individuals. For most egalitarians, however, I assume that the absence of just 
background institutions does not excuse oneself from pursuing justice. Therefore, the egalitarian 
parent has some duty to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, 
at least when this can be done with little cost to herself.  12
 The egalitarian parent who fights for the establishment of more just institutions might 
consider her obligations to pursue justice thus satisfied.  While I take this to be necessary for the 
egalitarian parent, it does not seem sufficient to excuse the parent from further action. I assume 
that the egalitarian parent also has a more general desire to pursue justice than what follows 
strictly from a Rawlsian account. The egalitarian parent also does not want to make exceptions 
for herself while trying to cooperate with others; she is committed to fairness and wants to act on 
principles which other people could not reasonably reject. Therefore, I assume that the 
egalitarian parent has a general desire to be able to justify her actions to other reasonable people. 
 In the following, I take up Brighouse and Swift’s concept of family relationship goods in 
order to distinguish between legitimate and excessive parental partiality. To further articulate the 
distinction, I propose three separately sufficient standards by which the egalitarian can judge 
whether or not acts of partiality can be justified to others.  
V.I An Adequacy Standard  
One reason why parental partiality is often assumed to be unobjectionable is that parents are 
assumed to have a duty to provide for their children. Young children are not yet moral agents; 
they are not responsible for their own judgments or for their own welfare. Absent a state-run 
 In fact, Rawls makes this duty explicit in his chapter on Duty and Obligation (TJ 294). 12
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institution for childrearing, parents are best situated to care for children in their status as moral 
patients. As the distributively determined caretakers, parents assume duties toward their children 
to provide for their morally relevant interests.   13
Accordingly, parents must at least be permitted to be partial to their children to the extent 
that partiality is required to adequately provide for their morally relevant interests. Of course 
what constitutes a child’s morally relevant interests is another can of worms in itself. Here, I only 
mean to sketch a number of considerations that might factor into or constitute an adequacy 
standard by which we can distinguish between legitimate and excessive partiality in the context 
of necessary provisions. While not exhaustive, I will consider a range from very unobjectionable 
to quite objectionable considerations.  
 At the most unobjectionable level, an adequacy standard says that parents are required to 
be partial to their children insofar as partiality is necessary to provide at least minimal means of 
subsistence and shelter, and to make sure their child attends school. They must also be partial 
toward their child to the extent that it is necessary to protect their child from harm and take all 
measures necessary to avoid charges of neglect or abuse. In this context, partiality feels almost 
too strong a word. Parents have these special obligations toward their children, whether or not 
they even like their children! All I mean by partiality here is that a parent acts more in favor of 
her particular child than she would any other child. Perhaps adults independently of whether they 
are parents have an obligation to provide this minimal means of subsistence for all children, to 
 I mean here that once a parent has consented to be a parent that she thereby assumes duties toward 13
her child. I do not mean to say that someone who births a child automatically assumes duties toward that 
child, and I certainly do not mean that once a fetus is created that the host of that fetus assumes duties 
toward that fetus. Given these clarifications, I take the claim to be unobjectionable. 
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take all measures necessary to protect all children from neglect or abuse. However, an appeal to 
the value of the family can only ground the obligations parents have toward their own children.  
 Of course, these legally rudimentary obligations for parents only scrape the surface of the 
relevant interests of children for which parents are responsible. Another duty often assumed to 
fall to parents is the duty to develop their child’s autonomy. Therefore, parents would be required 
to be partial to their child to the extent to which it is necessary to develop an autonomous human 
being. This duty is assumed so that children can eventually become moral agents. 
 Concerned with the narrow valorization of agency-related goods, others argue in favor of 
a capabilities approach to parental responsibility.  Given a capabilities approach, parents would 14
be responsible for developing a child’s capabilities for core functionings. In addition to providing 
for an autonomous life, then, a parent would provide for a child’s being capable of having loving 
relationships, living a healthy life, and other functionings we determine to be “core,” or valuable. 
The capabilities approach aims to ensure that children are raised such that they are capable of 
living good lives. Therefore, an adequacy standard for partiality would require that parents be 
allowed to be partial to their children to the extent that partiality is necessary for parents to 
develop their children’s capabilities for core functionings.  
Some philosophers, such as Colin Macleod, are concerned that all of these accounts fail 
to capture one core responsibility of parents: to facilitate the goodness of their children’s lives 
qua children. In addition to preparing children for their adult lives, parents also have an 
obligation to make sure that their children have good childhoods. According to this approach to 
parental obligation, parental partiality is required to the extent that it is necessary for parents to 
 Macleod, 185. 14
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provide their children with good lives, to realize those family relationship goods that accrue to 
the child.  
What we take to be reasonable parental partiality is in part determined by what we take 
parents to be responsible for their children. These accounts are not irrefutable- we may find 
reasons to think we are more or less especially morally obligated to provide for our children as 
opposed to providing for others. Necessarily, then, there are ambiguities about what forms of 
partiality are justified by appeal to the adequacy standard. We can get clearer about what forms 
of partiality are permitted by getting clearer about what parents owe their children, a subject for 
another paper.  
V.II A Meaningfulness Standard 
In their paper, “School choice and the burdens of justice,” Clayton and Stevens argue that in 
some circumstances, we have a duty of justice to accept an inadequate education for our children 
in the fight for the realization of educational justice. In this section, I will assume that Clayton 
and Stevens’s objections to parental partiality will not be met by appealing to an adequacy 
standard, either because the adequacy standard will be rejected by Clayton and Stevens or the 
adequacy standard is weak enough that it will not require providing an adequate education for 
your child.  In order to argue that parents need not necessarily abandon partiality to ensure fair 15
equality of opportunity regardless of any adequacy standard, I will argue that parents are justified 
 I find it unlikely that Clayton and Stevens could provide an argument for rejecting the adequacy 15
standard on either ground. However, this section aims to show how the meaningfulness is separately 
sufficient for justifying parental partiality. Therefore, we can assume for now that the adequacy standard 
fails to understand the role of the meaningfulness standard. 
!20
in being partial to their children in at least some instances when being partial to their children is 
necessary for either themselves or for their children to live meaningful lives.  
 To refute the family relationship goods account of parental partiality, Clayton and Stevens 
point to the failure of Brighouse and Swift’s account to respond to non-ideal circumstances. 
While we may allow a degree of parental partiality to disrupt equality in the context of just 
background institutions, they argue, it does not follow that we should allow parental partiality in 
the absence of a just background. To illustrate, they ask us to imagine that there are 50 children 
who have got into danger in the sea. As a passer-by, you can run to a nearby boat and row it out 
to the children to save their lives. You are not alone on the shore- four other people could help 
you. Under ideal circumstances, you would only contribute your fair share, the other four would 
help you rescue. But if the others refuse to help, it would be unreasonable for you to throw up 
your arms and say you cannot accomplish anything on your own. Even at the cost of exhaustion, 
you should go row out to the children to save them.   16
 In ideal circumstances, you are justified being partial to your child even if there is a small 
cost to equality by doing so. To refrain from partiality when acting partially toward your child 
comes at a greater cost to equality, then, would be to do more than your “fair share.” What 
Clayton and Stevens argue they have shown through their example is that “the moral requirement 
to promote the good of justice remains intact even when it is rendered more burdensome and 
unfair by the immoral behavior of others” (123). Therefore, even though it is due to no fault of 
your own that acting partially toward your child comes at a greater cost to equality than in ideal 
 This example is strictly borrowed from Clayton and Stevens. For those not interested in being faithful to 16
Clayton and Stevens’s example, consider substituting a larger boat for a rowboat to lend plausibility to the 
example. 
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circumstances, justice requires that you bear that cost yourself by refraining from helping your 
child.  
 What Clayton and Stevens seem to miss about Brighouse and Swift’s account is the 
distinctive value of family relationship goods and the relevance of partiality in our moral 
consideration. Brighouse and Swift do not simply appeal to fair shares to make their case; they 
do not argue that individuals are entitled to a certain share of family relationship goods in ideal 
circumstances. Rather, they appeal to how family relationship goods are a unique contribution to 
an individual’s life.  The example Clayton and Stevens use to refute Brighouse and Swift leaves 
out family relationship goods entirely, thus leaving out the thrust of Brighouse and Swift’s 
argument.  
 Consider the following case. Suppose there are four children drowning and that a parent 
could use the rowboat to save three other children at sea or she could use the rowboat to save her 
drowning child. The other children are a good ways away from her child, and she does not have 
enough time to save them both. Surely, the parent would not appeal to fair shares to say that in 
ideal circumstances she would be allowed to save her child while the other passersby saved the 
other children. All that matters to the parent, in that moment, is that she saves her child because 
of how valuable her daughter is to her.  
 In this example, it is not obvious whether we should condemn or praise the mother. If we 
acted according to some utilitarian conceptions of justice, we would clearly condemn her for 
choosing to save her child.  Yet, it seems reasonable, if not admirable, that a mother is so 17
 Of course, there are many more interesting variations of utilitarianism that might allow for her to save 17
her child, for example if acting on the general rule that you can save the lives of your loved ones without 
directly causing harm to others would promote the greatest happiness, a rule utilitarian would favor that 
she act according that rule. 
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committed to protecting her child- a family relationship good that accrues to both herself and her 
child -that she saves her child, even while recognizing that justice, if justice is utilitarian, 18
demands her to do otherwise. The mother’s desire to protect her son is importantly and uniquely 
valuable to the mother, even if the mother’s desire is not valuable enough through the lens of 
justice to justify saving her son over the three other children. In light of conflict between the 
goods of justice and her love for her son, it seems reasonable for the goods of justice to cease to 
be decisive for the mother. As Susan Wolf writes, “if the meaning of one’s life and one’s very 
identity is bound up with someone as  deeply as a mother’s life is characteristically tied to her 
son’s, why should the dictates of impartial morality be regarded as decisive?” (“Partiality” 253). 
When what propels a mother forward in life- the life of her own son- is compromised, it seems 
reasonable for the mother to not feel the weight of the goods of justice as heavily. Therefore, 
even if an appeal to fair shares may not justify acting partially in the face of injustice, just how 
valuable our family relationship goods are to our lives might be sufficient to outweigh any 
utilitarian calculation.  
 We might be inclined to say that the realization of family relationship goods, whenever 
they are so integral to the meaningfulness of our lives, is sufficient to outweigh the goods of 
justice. However, the means necessary to realize our family relationship goods might 
nevertheless be so demanding or so outrageous that the goods of justice outweigh the value of 
our family relationship goods. Suppose that a mother has been asked to testify against her son, 
knowing that he has committed murder. If he is convicted, he will suffer gravely. If she lies in her 
 While it is difficult to formulate relationship goods precisely, we might formulate this good as “acting 18
from a general desire to protect the safety and well-being of a particular person.” Serving this role for 
another person is uniquely valuable, and having someone act in this way for our own safety and well-
being is uniquely valuable. 
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testimony, they will have no grounds for conviction. Furthermore, without the mother’s 
testimony, the preponderance of evidence incriminates another, innocent man and the other man 
will be convicted in his place.  In such a case, we might say that there is something “positively 19
reasonable (and not just understandable) about the woman who, having recognized that impartial 
morality instructs her to turn her son in, wonders whether to act according to impartial morality 
or not.” Without what gives her life meaning, the mother would have little if any reason for 
caring about anything in the world at all.  
 While we can understand why the mother acts from her desire to protect her child- her 
desire is uniquely valuable and provides her life with meaning- that value is nonetheless 
insufficient to outweigh the injustice of allowing an innocent man to go to jail. Meaningfulness 
does not, as it were, “trump” all other moral considerations. Rather, meaningfulness gives us an 
understanding of why family relationship goods are so valuable compared to other goods. 
Enjoying a piece of chocolate is valuable, reading a pleasant novel is valuable. However, neither 
gives an individual meaning in her life. Given the relative importance of family relationship 
goods, they are due more weight than simple preferences in our moral considerations. The 
meaningfulness standard thus states that what counts as legitimate parental partiality is in part 
determined by how essential realizing family relationship goods is to the meaning of a person’s 
life. 
 To understand the weight of family relationship goods in the context of fair equality of 
opportunity, consider the following. Perhaps what has driven a mother through various obstacles 
in life- a messy divorce, an overwhelming job- has been the dream of giving her child a better 
 This is a modified example from Wolf (253). 19
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life than she had. Worrying that her child might face the same fate she did if she stays in a public 
school, she sends her child to private school. By sending her child to private school, she confers 
advantages onto her child based on how she has chosen to allocate her resources. The thought 
that fair equality of opportunity ought to govern her actions when it would deny the mother what 
gives her life meaning seems “wholly detached from and out of touch with human 
psychology” (“Meaning” 307). 
 Looking at Brighouse and Swift’s account of family relationship goods combined with 
Wolf’s discussion of partiality and morality leads to interesting policy questions. What parent-
child relationships and spousal relationships have in common is that they realize a relationship 
good to be especially motivated by the desire to improve the quality of a specific person’s life. 
We find this good valuable, and in fact, having this kind of good is capable of providing our lives 
with meaning. This might also be true for certain forms of friendship. The legal system 
recognizes this good of spousal relationships: you cannot be required to testify against your 
spouse. Partiality is thus legally recognized as legitimate in the context of spousal relationships, 
but parent-child relationships realize the exact same relationship good. So why are there not any 
exemptions for parents testifying against their children, or children testifying against their 
parents?    20
V.III A Reasonableness Standard  
Parental partiality typically goes beyond what can be justified by appealing to what is necessary 
for meaningfulness in our life- if we didn’t pursue every avenue possible to provide for our 
 Currently, only four states do not require parents to testify against their children. See Smith, Tovia, 20
“Should Parents Have to Testify Against Their Kids In Court?” (2010). 
!25
children, we would still be able to have a meaningful relationship and life. But this does not 
exhaust the extent of parental partiality that is often taken to be acceptable. To take the paradigm 
example, reading bedtime stories does not necessarily meet either the adequacy standard or the 
meaningfulness standard. Yet, no one wants to demand that we give up reading our children 
bedtime stories. So how can we distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable parental 
partiality? 
I suggest a contractualist approach to understanding the boundaries of parental partiality, 
whereby we ask whether or not a rational and reasonable person could object to the ways in 
which we act partially toward our children. Drawing from W.M. Sibley, Rawls writes that 
knowing that someone is rational means that we know they will intelligently pursue whatever 
ends she has set for herself. Therefore, if someone has set the end of becoming a millionaire for 
herself, she will orchestrate the most intelligent plan for doing so. By contrast, knowing that 
someone is reasonable means that we know she is willing to govern her conduct by a principle 
which she and others can come to accept by taking into account the consequences of their actions 
on others’ well-being.  Therefore, the reasonable person is not strictly egoistic; if becoming a 21
millionaire violates a principle which she and other find acceptable, then she cannot reasonably 
do so. A reasonable person cares about being able to justify her motivations to others with whom 
she can cooperate as free and equal on terms all can accept. The strictly rational but unreasonable 
person lacks the particular form of moral sensibility “that underlies the desire to engage in fair 
 PL, 49. 21
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cooperation as such, and to do so on terms that others as equals might reasonably be expected to 
endorse.”  22
Rawls considers individuals to be reasonable if they are ready to accept norms or 
principles that everyone can accept and are therefore justifiable to them. For my purposes here, I 
will adopt Scanlon’s notion of reasonableness by which individuals are reasonable if they 
perform actions or act on principles that no one could reasonably reject. In order to understand 
the contrast, consider the following example used by Scanlon.  Suppose there is a proposed 23
principle under which several people could avoidably suffer, meaning there are alternative 
principles without that suffering. Now, suppose that those individuals are particularly self-
sacrificing. In such a case, it seems as though they could reasonably accept the proposed 
principle. However, it also does not seem like it would be unreasonable for those individuals to 
reject such a principle. Given the intuitive plausibility that this conception of reasonableness is 
more fair, I will be using Scanlon’s account. However, I take it that my account will still be of 
use regardless of which account of reasonableness you adopt.  
Now, consider how this reasonableness standard can be employed in the context of 
parental partiality. Perhaps a mother wants to send her child to a private school because he has 
special needs that cannot be accommodated in public schools. This might upset the resources 
available in the public school- if the mother was particularly involved, the school would suffer 
without her presence. Even so, we would need more reasons to understand how a reasonable 
person, a person committed to engaging in fair cooperation, could object to the mother pulling 
 Ibid, 51. 22
 Scanlon, 111-2. 23
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her son from the public school. Perhaps the mother pulling her child out of school upsets the 
balance of fairness; however, this is not obvious from the case as described.  
Although I list this reasonableness standard as a third and separate standard by which we 
can distinguish between legitimate and excessive partiality, both the adequacy standard and 
meaningfulness standard can be subsumed under the reasonableness standard. I take it for 
granted that no one could reasonably reject either standard and that reasonableness is sufficient 
on its own. I list each standard as separately sufficient so as to provide a fuller articulation of 
what constitutes legitimate parental partiality and to provide individual justification in case one 
standard is determined to be inadequate.  
VI. A Case Study  
In order to see how each standard operates in practice, I offer the following case study.  
Jacob and Jonathan are Latino and African American, a couple, and about to adopt a child. While 
both were raised in lower-income families, they have managed to beat the odds and made their 
way into academia. They consider what to do about their pending adoption. So far, they have 
been living in a historically black neighborhood so that they could give back to the community. 
However, they worry about what life will be like for their child. As a mixed-race gay couple, 
they already receive enough harassment as adults and anticipate a great deal of harassment for 
their child. Because they are adopting a black child, they also anticipate the child inheriting a 
legacy of oppression on multiple fronts.  
Given their circumstances, they consider the idea of moving to a district with a better 
public school. They want to make sure their child receives adequate attention, that there are 
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enough resources in the school for their child to be protected from bullying, and that she receives 
the kind of education necessary to be successful further down the road in life. However, they are 
also quite involved in the district’s politics, advocating for educational reform so that the 
community’s future can be improved. While making their decision, they worry about pulling 
their weight in the community, leaving the children of the community behind in order to give 
their child opportunities with their social advantages.  
With any of the standards I have argued for, Jacob and Jonathan’s decision is not an easy 
one. Depending on what adequacy standard we choose, the decision becomes more or less 
challenging. With an autonomy adequacy standard, we would need more details about the school 
to assess whether or not it allowed for their daughter’s development into an autonomous adult. 
For example, if the graduation rate were so dismal that it seemed unlikely she would make it out 
with a diploma, Jonathan and Jacob would have good reason to think that the adequacy standard 
would allow them to move districts. If she were only likely to face harassment, the adequacy 
standard might not apply; she might become fiercely independent in order to prove to her 
harassers that she is not some weak woman to be pushed around.  
The same can be said about the capabilities adequacy standard. If the school’s 
environment is so horrible- with discrimination and bullying in every corner of the school- that 
she will be unable to live a happy, healthy life in the future, the adequacy standard would allow 
for switching districts. But the school might also develop her capability for resilience in the face 
of oppression. She might even develop more useful capabilities, such as understanding people 
whose backgrounds differ from hers.  
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Perhaps living in the neighborhood, attending school with students who look like her 
even if they do not have as much money as her, could make for a good childhood even with an 
inadequate education. Once again, we would need to know more about what life would be like 
for her in that school and in that community. Even with the last adequacy standard, then, the 
answer is unclear.  
 When it comes to the meaningfulness standard, no external observer is able to say when it 
has been met. Perhaps Jonathan and Jacob are like the parent discussed earlier, whose life has 
been shaped and sacrificed in order to give her child a better life than she had. On the contrary, 
Jonathan and Jacob might just take their child to be on a check-list of life events that they want 
to accomplish. Whether or not parental partiality in this instance is required for Jonathan or 
Jacob to live a meaningful life depends on the details of their self-assigned projects and 
purposes.  
 Even if they do not conclude that the adequacy or meaningfulness standard gives them 
permission, Jonathan and Jacob might ask themselves: could anyone reasonably object to us 
moving districts so that our child can go to a better school? I do not suggest that there is an easy 
answer to this question; it may be impossible to answer. In order to answer this question, 
Jonathan and Jacob must imagine what a reasonable person might respond to the question if they 
knew all of their circumstances.  
Of course, they might not have a full imaginative grasp of how others might respond and 
their assessment of reasonableness might be biased in their own favor. Here, the reasonableness 
standard is subject to the ordinary criticisms of a contractualist approach. While I argue that my 
framework provides at least a fuller articulation of the boundaries of legitimate parental partiality 
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than Brighouse and Swift’s account, I do not mean to suggest that those boundaries can be easily 
identified, or identified at all, even with the fullest articulation.  
VII. Conclusion  
I have so far only given a framework for weighing the value of family relationship goods 
against the value of fair equality of opportunity. However, there is more for the egalitarian parent 
to consider even while being partial. An egalitarian parent can and might even feel especially 
charged with the responsibility to minimize the costs of partiality. In this last section, I discuss 
ways in which a partial parent can minimize the costs of partiality by returning to Jonathan and 
Jacob.  
Suppose Jonathan and Jacob ultimately decide it would be best to switch districts in order 
to provide their daughter with a better public school education. As already noted, this has a 
number of negative consequences for the school in their current district; they would not be able 
to attend the school’s PTA meetings and advocate for its students and teachers, they would not be 
able to vote in the district’s school board elections, and they would, in one respect, be failing to 
show solidarity. However, they are not without any means of fighting back against the costs of 
partiality. Jonathan and Jacob can, and perhaps ought, to combat the non-ideal circumstances that 
make otherwise permissible partiality impermissible.  
For one, Jonathan and Jacob can still advocate at a statewide and nationwide level for 
educational reform in order to mitigate the disparities between the districts. They can become 
engaged in political discussions focused on school choice, perhaps even advocating against a 
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system that allows them to simply move to a better district. They can also return to their old 
district to tutor children at the school and volunteer for after-school programs.  
Lastly, Jonathan and Jacob can engage in intentionally egalitarian parenting practices. 
They could send their child to Campus Camp Wellstone, a grassroots organizer training program, 
instead of soccer camp. They can read their child egalitarian bedtime stories, like Princess 
SmartyPants. While Jonathan and Jacob would not be directly mitigating the costs of partiality, 
they would be indirectly mitigating the costs through their child. By engaging in intentionally 
egalitarian parenting practices, they can prepare their child to combat the institutions that make 
permissible partiality under ideal circumstances impermissible under non-ideal circumstances. 
Therefore, their child can inherit their advocacy, an inheritance that does not compromise the 
goods of justice.  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